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Abstract: We examine the discretionary use of loan loss provisions during the recent financial crisis, when Euro Area banks experienced not only a negatuve effect on the quality of their loans and a reduction in their profitability, but were also subject to a new form of stricter supervision, namely the EBA 2010 and 2011 stress test exercises. Overall, we find support for the only income smoothing hypothesis and we do not observe any difference in listed banks'behavior when compared to unlisted banks. Banks subject to EBA stress tests had higher incentives to smooth income only for the 2011 EBA exercise when a larger and more detailed set of information was released. This may suggest an unwilled side effect that accounting setters and banking regulators and supervisors should account for.
Introduction
Together with prudential capital requirements, loan loss provisions (LLPs) are crucial to transmit macroeconomic conditions to real economy as they affect bank performance and incentives to issue new loans. How bank managers decide their provisioning policies has attracted many researchers in the banking field especially because they merge different information and behaviors.
LLPs are usually classified as either specific or general. The former, also known as nondiscretionary provisions, depend on expected future losses and are added to specific reserves (Whalen, 1994; Beaver & Engle, 1996) . General provisions, also called discretionary, increase generic reserves to protect the bank against not yet unidentified losses. General provisions are judgmental and can be used to pursue different management objectives. In particular, LLPs can be manipulated to meet minimum capital requirements and/or to improve the market's perception by stabilizing their banks' income (income smoothing).
Recent literature has emphasized the relationship between LLPs and bank capital requirements with the credit cycle. Low specific provisions during expansion periods push banks to grant new loans while their incentives to supply new credits decrease during downturns, when banks are constrained to set aside a larger amount of provisions. Furthermore, it becomes harder to meet prudential capital requirements and banks become more likely to reduce their lending activity.
The pro-cyclical nature of both capital requirements and provisioning rules calls for greater collaboration between accounting setters and banking regulators and supervisors, especially after the 2007 crisis.
Based on these issues and motivated by the debate on the opportunity of a stricter banking regulation (i.e., Basel III counter-cyclical buffer) and supervision (i.e., European Banking Authority (EBA) stress tests), this research investigates whether bank managers' incentives to discretionally Sood (2012) , whereas, to the best of our knowledge, the effects on European banks have not been investigated yet. Overall, our purpose is twofold: first, to provide new evidence to the conflicting results of previous literature, by focusing on provisioning policies during stressed market conditions; second, to investigate whether a completely new form of stricter supervision (i.e., the EBA stress tests) during the crisis period may also affect the discretionary use of LLPs. To date, this latter issue in particular has never been studied before. The crisis severely affected loan portfolio quality and earnings of Euro Area banks and might have reduced the incentives to manage income and regulatory capital via LLPs, due to the increase of specific/non-discretionary provisions as they are inversely correlated with bank loans quality. Nevertheless, because of the decline in their credit portfolio quality and higher incentives to shift risk (Fonseca & Gonzales, 2008) , banks' regulatory capital ratios decreased during the crisis. Moreover, a stricter supervision, as that imposed by EBA amidst the crisis through the 2010 and 2011 stress testing exercises, required banks to be resilient to stressed scenarios and imposed more pressure on bank managers' decisions.
Based on a panel data analysis, our empirical evidence shows that banks tended to smooth income but not to influence regulatory capital via LLPs. In particular, incentives to smooth income increased after the crisis, irrespective of the different nature of public and private.
As to the behavior of banks that underwent the EBA stress tests, we observe that the disclosure of the 2011 test results together with the release of a detailed set of sensitive information is associated with more income smoothing by tested banks, as they need to stabilize their income in order to improve the market's perception of their risk. This may be interpreted as an unwilled side effect that both accounting and banking regulators and supervisors should carefully take into account. To mitigate possible concerns about endogeneity issues, we also run a GMM estimation and find that our results are qualitatively unchanged. As robustness checks, we test our hypotheses excluding Spanish and Greek banks due to the specific provisioning mechanism adopted in Spain 5 provisions if earnings before taxes and provisions raise. Evidence from Pérez, Salas-Fumas, and Saurina (2008) and Shrieves and Dahl (2003) supports income smoothing for Spanish and Japanese commercial banks, respectively. Evidence referred to Asian emerging markets does not univocally support the earnings smoothing hypothesis as well (Laeven & Majnoni, 2003; Craig, Davis, & Pascual, 2006; Packer & Zhu, 2012) .
To reduce earnings volatility and financial markets' risk perception, publicly traded banks might have stronger incentives in smoothing their income, if compared to unlisted banks (Nichols, Wahlen, & Wieland, 2009) . Accordingly, Beatty, Ke and Petroni (2002) show that a higher number of stakeholders makes listed banks more engaged in income smoothing. According to Anandarajan et al. (2007) , publicly traded banks use income to signal success and strength to their shareholders, since they raise funds in the stock market. However, Fonseca and Gonzales (2008) suggest that listed banks are less likely to smooth income because they are subject to a stricter supervision because of their larger size and greater impact in the case of a banking crisis.
To the best of our knowledge, banks' income smoothing during adverse financial market conditions has not been fully investigated yet. El Sood (2012) finds that during the crisis US banks use provisions to smooth income upward. According to Packer and Zhu (2012) the global financial crisis has significantly increased income smoothing practice only for Indian banks, but not for the rest of the Asian banking systems that they take into account. Multiple factors might affect bank managers' provisioning decisions under stressed economic conditions. The crisis might limit the scope for a discretionary use of banks' provisions because of the increasing and massive deterioration in the quality of their loans and the associated increase in the share of specific LLPs.
Nevertheless, the peculiar features of the turmoil originated by a toxic assets contagion in the financial markets in the 2007 might have created incentives to shift risk and consequently smooth income, for both private and listed banks. As a result, during the crisis banks might be more engaged in income smoothing relative to the pre-crisis period (Hypothesis 1), especially if they are 6 publicly traded as they have higher incentives in reporting stable income numbers, especially during extremely volatile periods (Hypothesis 2). 
H1

Capital management
By manipulating LLPs bank managers can avoid the cost of violating prudential regulation on bank capital adequacy. According to the Basel II Capital Accord, which was in force during the investigation period, the Tier1 capital includes retained earnings, implying that banks characterized by a low capital endowment might have more incentives to make lower LLPs. Nevertheless, if banks' loan loss reserves are lower than 1.25% of risk-weighted assets (RWAs), an increase in provisions raises the Tier2 capital and, overall, the total regulatory capital ratio (BCBS, 2006) . The sign of the relation between provisions and regulatory capital will derive from which of these two effects predominates and empirical evidence is not conclusive (Ahmed et al., 1999; Pérez et al., 2008; Craig et al., 2006; Anandarajan et al., 2007; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Leventis, Dimitropoulos & Anandarajan, 2011) .
We expect low-capital banks to be characterized by higher incentives to use LLPs to manage their capital after the crisis broke out (Hypothesis 3), because both the worsening macroeconomic scenario and the rising counterparty risk exposures have increased banks probability of default.
Furthermore, the associated costs of violating capital requirements increase in distressed economic conditions because raising capital is more expensive and reducing the risk weighted assets could force them to close profitable customer relationships and/or sell assets at unfavourable conditions. Because of the greater use of the stock market as source of funds, listed banks are expected to be 7 more willing to meet capital requirements and are more likely to manage their capital ratios (Hypothesis 4). 
H3
Supervisory stress testing and discretionary use of LLPs
The effectiveness of banking regulation and supervision in preventing managers from excessive risk-taking behaviour might create incentives to use LLPs for income smoothing and capital management purposes (Fonseca & Gonzales, 2008) . In this regard, EBA 2010 and 2011 stress tests offer a privileged context to investigate these issues. By assuming EBA stress tests are an example of supervisory intervention that can severely affect managerial discretion in making provisions, we use them as an empirical experiment to detect whether stricter supervision during the crisis provides a disciplining effect on managers' decisions and makes bank provisioning policies less prone to pursue discretionary objectives.
Additionally, from a disclosure perspective, we also might expect banks that underwent EBA stress testing exercises to be more constrained in manipulating LLPs, due to the greater release of bank-specific information that stress tests both require and make public. In fact, on the one hand, Therefore, we expect EBA exercises to make banks less likely to use LLPs to smooth their income (Hypothesis 5). As for the capital management hypothesis, we suggest that another effect can prevail over the disciplining effect: since the EBA exercises focus on capital adequacy under A main assumption behind these hypotheses is that banks' managers care about the results of the EBA tests. Some recent research papers have investigated the informative content of the stress testing exercises, particularly focusing on their impact on banks' stock price. Beltratti (2011) finds that, by making public details about each bank capital shortfall, the 2011 EBA stress test provided sensitive information to the market. Based on the analysis of market reaction on the stress tests' announcement dates, Cardinali and Nordmark (2011) show that investors cared little for the 2010 stress test, whereas they had a negative reaction to the release of the 2011 methodology, with no effect on on un-tested credit institutions. By focusing on price changes upon the disclosure of the 2011 results, Petrella and Resti (2013) show that on the results date the market reacted strongly to the disclosure of detailed information, thus corroborating the hypothesis that the stress test exercise mitigates bank opaqueness. Goldstein and Sapra (2011) 8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 9 more positive relationship between loan loss provisions and earnings before taxes and provisions in 2011.
Empirical analysis
Sample selection
We collect Euro Area banks' IAS-compliant balance-sheet data referred to the 2005 -2011 period from Bankscope. To build our sample we adopt the following constraints. First, we focus on banks that are significantly involved in traditional lending activity, i.e. with customer loans higher than 50% of total assets over the sample period. To reduce size-related bias, we do not consider banks whose average asset value over the entire sample period is lower than the second quartile of the average asset distribution of the entire sample. Our initial sample is made up of banks that are from the 21 European countries included in the 2010 and 2011 EBA stress tests. To ensure consistency in our analyses, we only keep banks with data available for more than five. Finally, to address potential issues with outliers, we eliminate the extreme bank/year observations (i.e., observations for which a variable presents values lower than the 1 st percentile and higher than the decisions, we delete banks whose stocks were delisted or began to trade during the sample period.
Our sample includes 30 out of 91 credit institutions that were subject to the 2010 stress test exercise, of which 28 were tested in the 2011 stress test as well. et al. 1999) . Particularly, we use the variable NPL i,t , the ratio of non-performing loans divided by total assets . This variable is positively related to loan loss provisions. Our proxy for the discretionary component of LLPs is the variable LOAN i,t , which is equal to customer loans divided by total assets. The variable GDPGR j,t corresponds to the annual growth rate of the gross domestic product at constant prices for the country j at year t and is Based on prior literature (see, among others, Leventis et al. 2011; Bouvatier & Lepetit 2008; Anandarajan et al. 2007; Ahmed et al. 1999) these variables coefficients are expected to be both positive.
Methodology
Testing for the discretionary use of LLPs during the crisis
t i t i t i t i t i t j t i t i t i TIER CRISIS a EBTP CRISIS a TIER a EBTP a GDPGR a LOAN a NPL a a LLP , , 7 , 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 , 1 1             (1) LLP i,t ,
Testing for LLPs discretionary use by listed banks
Potential differences in listed banks' behaviour relative to unlisted credit institutions are estimated through the model presented in the following equation (2), where, relative to equation (1) First, the two interaction terms LISTED•EBTP i,t and LISTED•TIER1 i,t are generated by interacting our key variables with an indicator variable, LISTED, equal to 1 for listed banks and 0 otherwise. These interaction terms allow us to examine whether, overall, listed credit institutions use LLPs to smooth income and manage capital at a larger extent than unlisted banks. If coefficients α 8 and α 10 of equation (2) were positive, that would be the case. Furthermore, to specifically test for the Hypotheses 2 and 4, according to which, listed banks are even more willing to report stable income numbers and more likely to be engaged in capital management practice during the crisis, we generate the two two-way interaction variables, LISTED•EBTP i,t •CRISIS and LISTED•TIER1 i,t •CRISIS. Should their coefficients α 9 and α 11 be positive, Hypotheses 2 and 4 would be confirmed.
Testing for LLPs discretionary use by EBA stress tested banks
According to the Hypotheses 5 and 6, we expect banks that underwent the EBA's stress tests to be less involved in the income smoothing practice but more engaged in manipulating capital. To test for these hypotheses, we estimate the following model: 
Relative to equation (2), we first interact the sample binary variable EBA_TESTED, that equals 1 if bank i participated in at least one of the two EBA stress tests and 0 otherwise, with the two dummies DY2010 and DY2011, equal to 1 if the observation year is 2010 and 2011, respectively, and 0 otherwise. A positive (negative) sign for their coefficients α 12 and α 13 in equation (3) would entail that, compared to banks that were not subject to EBA stress tests, tested banks set a greater (smaller) amount of provisions aside at the end of the year in which they were included in the EBA stress test exercise, relative to the rest of the years included in the sample 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 Based on the variables formerly included in equation (2), we also control for the evidence on tested banks being driven by the public nature of most of them. The following Table 1 summarizes labels, name and description of the variables used to test our hypotheses.
[ Table 1 here]
Descriptive statistics
Main descriptive statistics referred to our sample banks are shown in Table 2 . The average value of the variable LLP is slightly higher than 0.43%, confirming that provisions for loan losses are a relatively important bank accrual. On average, NPL is 3.46% and, as expected, experiences an increasing trend over the analysis time period. Customer loans are almost 72% of total assets, confirming the traditional nature of the business that our sample banks run and remains quite stable over time. EBTP is on average 3.17% and it shows a markedly decreasing trend over the six-year time horizon we take into account. The variable measuring banks' endowment of primary regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets, is almost 10.6, well above the minimum required by both the Basel 2 Capital Accord in force during the investigation period, and the incoming Basel 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 14 the quality of their regulatory capital, both in line with national and international authorities' responses to the crisis, and also anticipates the new Basel III framework that the BCBS was setting just in those years.
We detect differences between listed and unlisted banks and stress-tested and untested banks and show that the respective means are statistically different for all the variables. Particularly, as expected, on average, publicly traded banks are larger than private ones and are less involved in lending activity. Even if they are characterized by a better credit quality, which may be largely explained by the greater diversification opportunities due to their larger size, listed banks tend to set a greater amount of loan loss provisions aside, entailing a more prudent approach to credit risk management. These results are probably due to the market disciplining effect. Publicly traded banks are less profitable than private banks. This can be the consequence of the higher customer loans share of total assets of the latter. In fact, if issued to sufficiently risky counterparties, customer loans can be much more profitable than other bank assets. This would also be consistent with the higher average value of TIER1 for unlisted banks: a larger amount of primary regulatory capital endowment has to protect them against a greater risk exposure.
Our main variables show statistically different means even when tested banks are compared to untested banks. Particularly, the former are less profitable, less involved in the traditional lending activity, are characterized by both lower Tier1 capital ratios and a less non-performing loans. Not surprisingly, these results are similar to those highlighted before in comparing listed and unlisted banks and can be mainly explained by the larger average size of tested banks. Nevertheless, contrary to what found in the comparison between listed and unlisted banks, the difference in the mean values of LLP between tested and untested banks is not statistically significant.
[ Table 2 here]
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Descriptive statistics reported in Table 3 are calculated by distinguishing between the years preceding the 2008 (pre-crisis years) and the period 2008 -2011 (crisis years). As expected, the entire sample and the two groups of listed and tested banks set a greater amount of loan loss provisions aside after the crisis broke out, with statistically significant differences in means. This is consistent with the statistically significant increase in the average value of NPL for, again, the whole sample, publicly traded and tested banks. Mainly due to the greater amount of provisions made after the eruption of the crisis, we find a statistically significant decline in EBTP for both the whole sample and the group of listed banks. EBTP decreased also for tested banks, but the mean value referred to the pre-crisis period is not statistically different from the value of the crisis period.
The average LOAN systematically increased, though the difference in means between the two periods is statistically significant only when we consider the entire sample banks. Consistently with the increasing risk in banks' credit portfolio, the average value of TIER1 went up for the entire sample, listed and tested banks, being in all the three cases above the minimum prudential requirement in force during the investigation period. The differences in means between the two periods is always statistically significant. The variable measuring bank size increased not only for the total sample, but also for listed and tested bank in the crisis period, though the difference in means is statistically significant only for listed banks.
[ Table 3 here] Table 4 provides correlations of our variables. NPL, LOAN, and EBTP have a significant and positive association with LLP for the entire sample, listed and tested banks. The correlations of GDPGR and TA with LLP are both negative and statistically significant. Finally, as concerns the correlation between TIER1 and LLP, it is negative and significant for the whole sample, positive for both listed and tested banks, but significant only for the latter. Overall, based on the low correlations between the regressors, we can exclude cases of multicollinearity.
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Results
Panel data analysis is a very efficient tool and allows us to consider the unobservable and constant heterogeneity, i.e. each bank specific characteristics. Based on the Hausman test, we adopt fixed effects to estimate equations (1), (2) and (3). Our results are presented in Table 5 .
Evidence from equation (1) in Table 5 suggests that banks smooth their income via LLPs more intensively during the crisis ( 4 a is positive and statistically significant). This result supports our H1 hypothesis and is consistent with the evidence reported in El Sood (2012) for a sample of US banks. We do not find any significant difference in our banks' behavior in terms of capital management (hypothesis H3) during the period 2008 -2011 (the coefficient of CRISIS•TIER1 is not statistically significant). These findings are confirmed in the specifications of equations (2) Since prior literature has argued about the differences, in terms of informative content and market reaction, between the two EBA exercises, in equation (3) Overall, our results support the income smoothing hypothesis at the 1% confidence level.
However, contrary to what is required for the capital management hypothesis to be confirmed, the coefficient of the Tier1 capital ratio is always negative and economically not relevant, being also marginally significant at the 10% confidence level only for equations 1 and 2.
As to the control variables used in our models, we find that the l GDPGR is negatively and significantly associated with the LLP at 1% confidence level, for all the three estimated equations.
This suggests that banks make provisions during and not before economic recessions. The procyclical nature of our banks' behavior is consistent with previous empirical research. The coefficient of NPL is positive and statistically significant for all the equations shown in Table 5 at the 1% confidence level, confirming the direct relation between LLPs and credit quality. Customer loans are negatively correlated with loan loss provisions but the coefficient of the variable LOAN is neither statistically nor economically significant.
[ Table 5 here] 18
Robustness checks
The robustness of our results is tested through the following checks. First, banks from Spain and Greece are removed from the sample, because of the especially distressed situation of these two countries' banking sectors during the investigation period. Among the eight banks that failed the 2011 stress test, five were from Spain and two from Greece, and many other intermediaries in these two countries were very close to fail the test. Since these banks might have behaved on the basis of peculiar incentives, we decide to remove them from the sample to test if our results are biased by their inclusion. Furthermore, we eliminate Spanish banks also because of the specific regulatory constraints imposed on their provisioning policies by the Banco de España since 2000, i.e., the dynamic provisioning system. Based on dynamic provisioning requirements, Spanish banks are required to make provisions in periods of economic expansions so that they can be used during economic downturns. It is worth highlighting that this mechanism automatically implies income smoothing and aims to induce banks' countercyclical behavior in their provisioning practice, by also generally reducing managerial discretion. Table 6 shows the results obtained after dropping Spanish and Greek banks from the sample.
The variable CRISIS•EBTP is marginally significant at the 10% confidence level, showing a decrease in its statistical significance if compared to the analysis of the whole sample (see Table 5 ).
By dropping Spanish banks, therefore, we get rid of banks that can significantly contribute to the result of more income smoothing during the crisis, since they are forced by law to smooth their income over time. The capital management hypothesis is still not confirmed: the coefficient of the variable TIER1 is again negative and not economically significant, even if statistically significant. (3) is statistically significant at the 10% confidence level, whereas it was at the 5% for the overall sample. Consistently with what highlighted before, dropping Spanish banks makes its coefficient less statistically significant. As expected, and already shown in Table 5 , LLP is again positively and significantly correlated with the variables NPL and EBTP at the 1% confidence level, and negatively and significantly at the 1% confidence level with the annual real GDP growth rate.
[ Table 6 here]
The second robustness check is based on the use of the two-step system GMM estimation technique for dynamic models (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bover, 1995) . We adopt this technique to deal with a potential simultaneity issue affecting the determination of both some independent variables and LLP. In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity (if any), first-differences of the variables are used as instruments for the equations in levels. Results are presented in Table 7 1 . We implement a finite sample correction following Windmeijer (2005) , as suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998) . Based on Hansens' test and Arellano and Bond (1991), respectively, we do not have issues concerning instrument validity and serially uncorrelated error terms.
Overall, the two-step system GMM estimates show that our main results are confirmed at the usual confidence levels. All the control variables have the expected sign as in the GLS fixed effects analysis but LOAN is negatively and significantly related to LLP, suggesting that banks with larger credit portfolio make less provisions . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65   20   [Table 7 here]
Conclusions
We The table presents descriptive statistics of both the pre-crisis (2005 -2008) and the crisis (2009 -2011) periods for both all sample banks (columns 2 -3) and listed banks (columns 5 -6). It also shows descriptive statistics referred to both the years before the EBA stress tests and the two-year period 2010 -2011 for tested banks (columns 8 -9). The p-values of the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are reported. * * * , * * and * express significance at 1, 5 and 10%. See Table 1 for the variables definitions. (1), (2) and (3). In each regression the dependent variable is LLP. 28EBA_TESTED is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if bank i is one of the 28 banks subject to both the 2010 and 2011, and 0 otherwise; DY2010 (DY2011) is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is referred to the year 2010 (2011), and 0 otherwise. See Table 1 for the other variables definition. T-statistics are robust for heteroskedasticity. * * * , * * and * express significance at 1, 5 and 10%. The table reports the results of the GLS fixed effect (FE) estimates of equations (1), (2) and (3). In each regression the dependent variable is LLP. 28EBA_TESTED is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if bank i is one of the 28 banks subject to both the 2010 and 2011, and 0 otherwise; DY2010 (DY2011) is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is referred to the year 2010 (2011), and 0 otherwise. See Table 1 for the other variables definition. T-statistics are robust for heteroskedasticity. * * * , * * and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%. The table shows the two-step system GMM estimation of equations (1), (2) and (3). In each regression the dependent variable is LLP. 28EBA_TESTED is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if bank i is one of the 28 banks subject to both the 2010 and 2011, and 0 otherwise; DY2010 (DY2011) is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is referred to the year 2010 (2011), and 0 otherwise. See Table 1 for the other variables definition. p-values are in parentheses. AR(1) and AR(2) test for no serial correlation of first and second order, in the first differenced standard errors. Hansen j-stat tests for over-identifying restrictions. * * * , * * and * express significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
